

to have too much Arab unity. M will talk to Black about it. He wants to get more together and go to Hammarskjöld and say this is his idea now—he might be prepared to talk to people about it but does not want to say anything definitive. M won't do anything until he talks to the Sec again." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

2. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, January 17, 1958, 9:10 p.m.

5038. Deliver following from Secretary to Lloyd: "Dear Selwyn: I have received from Harold Caccia your January 17 message¹ about the forthcoming Baghdad Pact meeting.²

I entirely agree that it is necessary to find something else to put in our bags before we get to Ankara. For this reason I can tell you in strictest confidence that we are making a special effort to see if we can provide some more economic assistance. I am hopeful that we can come up with \$10 million or so, perhaps to be applied to the telecommunications project.³ Meanwhile, although I appreciate the difficulties for you, if

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-AN/1-1758. Top Secret; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Rockwell; cleared by Rountree, Owen Jones, and J. Wesley Jones of EUR; and approved and signed by Dulles.

¹In a personal message to Dulles, transmitted by British Ambassador Caccia on January 17, Lloyd wrote of his concern that the Baghdad Pact meeting would fail to live up to the expectations of its members, especially their expectation of "visible and concrete evidence that the United States is behind the Pact." Lloyd feared that the United States and United Kingdom would also disappoint the members on the question of Palestine and promotion of Western influence in Syria. He noted that the only suggestion his government had so far received from the United States was a survey of the possibility of the United States supplying aircraft to Iraq. As the traditional supplier of the Iraqi Air Force, Lloyd continued, such a proposal gave the British problems. Lloyd suggested that if the United States had aircraft to spare, it should give them to Iran "who is always asking for more, and would be the better candidate." Lloyd concluded his letter with the observation that Dulles' presence at the meeting precluded any possibility that it could be considered "a routine and business-like meeting." (*Ibid.*, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)

²The fourth meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact was held at Ankara, Turkey, January 27-30, 1958. Secretary Dulles attended as Chief of the U.S. Observer Delegation.

³On January 21, Dulles sent a memorandum to Eisenhower informing him that at the Ministerial Meeting of the Baghdad Pact "further evidence of U.S. support for the Pact will be expected." Since formal U.S. adherence to the pact and further military assistance to its members had been ruled out, Dulles stated that the best alternative was a \$10 million grant to construct a Baghdad Pact-approved telecommunications system linking the capitals of Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan. Dulles asked for authorization to announce it at the meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5-MSP/1-2158)